Resumo
Objetivo: Este artigo examina se os diretores representantes dos empregados atuam como agentes internos de inteligência competitiva em empresas chinesas listadas. O foco está em seu papel na facilitação da circulação de informações específicas da empresa, no apoio à tomada de decisão em nível de conselho e na melhoria das condições informacionais sob as quais as decisões de investimento são realizadas. O estudo também investiga se a assimetria informacional ajuda a explicar essa relação e se o papel dos diretores representantes dos empregados é mais evidente em situações de subinvestimento.
Metodologia/abordagem: Utilizando uma amostra de empresas chinesas listadas na bolsa A-share, o estudo emprega modelos de regressão em painel para examinar a relação entre diretores representantes dos empregados e ineficiência de investimento. A análise de mediação é utilizada para avaliar o papel da assimetria informacional, que serve como proxy empírica das condições informacionais internas. Testes adicionais incluem medidas alternativas de ineficiência de investimento e pareamento por escore de propensão (propensity score matching).
Originalidade/Relevância: O artigo reúne diretores representantes dos empregados, assimetria informacional e eficiência de investimento em um mesmo contexto empírico, mas os interpreta sob a perspectiva da inteligência competitiva. Em vez de considerar os diretores representantes dos empregados apenas como um arranjo de governança, o estudo os trata como agentes internos capazes de melhorar o fluxo de informações, apoiar a disseminação da inteligência e fortalecer o suporte à decisão dentro da organização. Dessa forma, a pesquisa desloca o foco da estrutura de governança para os processos informacionais que sustentam a alocação estratégica de recursos.
Principais resultados: Os resultados demonstram que os diretores representantes dos empregados reduzem significativamente a ineficiência de investimento. A assimetria informacional medeia essa relação. O efeito é assimétrico: os diretores representantes dos empregados contribuem principalmente para reduzir o subinvestimento, enquanto sua influência sobre o sobreinvestimento não apresenta significância estatística. O efeito também é mais forte em empresas estatais.
Contribuições teóricas/metodológicas: O artigo contribui para a literatura ao demonstrar que os diretores representantes dos empregados podem influenciar a eficiência dos investimentos por meio de seu impacto sobre as condições informacionais internas, e não apenas por sua participação formal no conselho. Os resultados sugerem que seu papel está intimamente relacionado à qualidade da informação, à disseminação interna do conhecimento e ao reconhecimento de oportunidades. De forma mais ampla, o estudo oferece uma explicação baseada em informação sobre como esses diretores podem fortalecer as condições internas de decisão associadas à alocação estratégica de recursos e, indiretamente, aos fundamentos da vantagem competitiva sustentável.
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